__MK__tabaqat · StrataEmergency Management & Response
Critical Infrastructure — "Lifelines"

A lifeline colour
is a judgement.
Show what it stands on.

The eight FEMA Community Lifelines as a ledger of their 30 fixed components — each colour suggested only where a live, keyless feed measures an impact, recommended by a person, and shown beside its evidence and the age of that evidence.

California reference implementation · 1,143 assertions · 38 behaviours On-prem · keyless · read-only · nothing seeded
© 2026 Tabaqat · Built on Strata — sovereign geospatial applications. Beside command, never the lifeline status of record. Every feed is a published, keyless source, probed 2026-10-21.
The decision this drives

The lifeline status the branch recommends — and which lead gets tasked.

FEMA's Community Lifelines Toolkit 2.1 (July 2023) is plain about who does what: lifeline conditions are "recommended by Situation Unit and validated by leadership". The colours mean impact against a pre-incident baseline, a snapshot of one operational period.

So the buyer's question is narrow: which of the eight lifelines is degraded here, on what evidence, and has a person confirmed the colour? The board never decides a colour, never validates one and never tasks anyone. It shows which colours have evidence behind them — and which are grey because nobody has reported.

Buyer: infrastructure branch chief · EOC Private half: an industrial or energy operator's own emergency centre
1 of 30lifeline components can carry a colour suggested from a live, keyless feed in California today — Energy · Power Grid, from the Cal OES outage feed

The other 29 render grey — needs report, each with the reason no keyless feed exists. That is what the doctrine's own Grey — Unknown is for: not a failure state, an honest one.

FEMA's own 2024 doctrine-update page asks what "the standard impact data and data sources for each lifeline component" should be. Read 2026-10-21, it is unchanged: the question is still open.

The finding that shaped the app

Every lifeline colour on the market is typed or scored by a person. None shows what it rests on.

Exposure is not impact

A hospital inside an outage polygon may be on backup power — and no backup-power status is published for any asset. So an asset inside an outage area is evidence under a component. It never sets a colour by itself.

Green is a claim

The toolkit's Green means "functioning at pre-incident levels". An absence of reports shows nothing of the kind. Green is suggested only where the feed covers the whole jurisdiction, is fresh, and reads below the Moderate threshold. Otherwise: grey.

Every colour has an age

A colour is a snapshot of one operational period. Every suggestion carries time of record, time of fetch and the measured cadence; every recommendation carries who, when and which period. Stale evidence withdraws its suggestion.

Our own first version broke all three: it suggested Green from missing evidence, turned five health facilities inside outage areas into a red Health and Medical row, and fell back to a synthetic outage set when the feed failed. This rebuild exists to undo that.

Where this sits — benchmark and coexist, never copy

The board runs beside the lifeline record you already keep.

What existsHow the colour is setLive outages × assets · cascadeVerdict
DHS S&T — Community Lifeline Status System (CLSS)weighted indicators score human assessments; free to government, on the agency's ArcGIS Onlinenot described · not mentionedThe closest rival. Continued federal funding "has not yet been guaranteed" (May 2025)
Esri Emergency Management Operationstyped in the Community Lifelines Editor (a Survey123 form); history tabnone · noThe stack the buyer may already own — we run beside it
Juvare WebEOC lifelines board · D4H extension packtyped; both list the pre-2023 seven lifelines, no Water SystemsWebEOC + PowerOutage.com overlay (Dec 2025), colours no lifeline · noThe system of record; we export what it ingests
CISA Gateway · INL All Hazards · Argonne EPfastno lifeline colourreal dependency models — behind accounts, not live-outage drivenThe topology. Gated, and rightly so
Lifelinessuggested from a measured impact, then recommended by a person — local, exportedoutage × asset fusion with its caveat · a cascade lens labelled heuristicThe evidence under the colour

CLSS gives a scored colour, Esri and WebEOC a typed one, PowerOutage.com an overlay. None says how much of the colour the evidence supports, how old that evidence is, or whether the person agreed with it.

The silhouette

A ledger, not a stoplight — and never a ranking.

Eight rows in the toolkit's fixed order, each holding a colour, its evidence and its agreement. A tile grid has no room for the evidence line, which is the product; a ranked list implies an order the lifelines do not have. The map is evidence, one click away.

Each row prints four parts: evidence coverage (1 of 2 components evidenced) · the measured impact and its age · exposure as evidence, with its PG&E-only caveat · agreement — agrees · overrides · no suggestion possible.

MinimalGreen — pre-incident levels
ModerateYellow — disrupted or limited
SignificantRed — significant impact
UnknownGrey — no evidence, or none fresh
AdministrativeBlue — not an operational status
Hollow · solida feed suggests · a person recommends
LIFELINE LEDGER · CALAVERAS COUNTY LOCAL — NOT SHARED ○ UNKNOWN Safety and Security0 of 5 evidenced ○ UNKNOWN Food, Hydration, Shelter0 of 4 evidenced ○ UNKNOWN Health and Medical0 of 5 evidenced ○ UNKNOWN ▼ Energy 1 of 2 evidenced Power Grid ○ MINIMAL → ● MINIMAL recommended · agrees 134 unplanned out · 3.0 per 1,000 · rec 12:56Z · every 15 min (measured) Fuel ○ NO FEED needs report — the national station API needs a key ○ NO FEED Communications0 of 5 evidenced ○ NO FEED Transportation0 of 5 evidenced ○ NO FEED Hazardous Materials0 of 2 evidenced ○ UNKNOWN Water Systems0 of 2 evidenced
Schematic of the reading, drawn to explain the shape — the shipped board is on the next slide. Figures in the Power Grid line are the recipe's worked Calaveras example (data of 2026-10-21 12:56Z). A lifeline is never suggested Green while any of its components is grey — so Energy stays unknown while Fuel has no feed.
The application, first paint

The first screen says what it knows — and why it can't say more.

Lifelines at first paint over California: the notice bar, the lifeline ledger with every lifeline not assessed this period, Energy's evidence line, the fusion strip over the map, and the feed bar listing all 16 feeds.
Shipped build, 2026-10-21 — a browser screenshot written by the automated driver on live data (record 17:26Z), not a mock-up.
  • A persistent notice bar. "Not the lifeline status of record — leadership validates lifeline status in the EOC's own system." Every export repeats it.
  • Nothing seeded. Every lifeline opens not assessed this period — a 12-hour operational period from 07:00 Pacific.
  • Energy's evidence, with its age. 9,066 customers without power (unplanned) · 0.236 per 1,000 · rec 17:26Z · fetched 17:37Z · publishes every 15 min (measured).
  • And why no colour. Partial coverage: 40 of 58 counties include electric territories not in the outage feed. No suggestion.
  • Exposure, with denominators. 0 of 454 open acute hospitals · 4 of 2,082 operating plants · 2 of 931 CAL FIRE stations inside PG&E outage areas.
  • The feed bar. 16 of 16 feeds listed · 11 bound · 5 gated or not browser-readable — each gap with its citation.
The only rule that colours anything

Energy · Power Grid, against a baseline — and a coverage test.

unplanned customers out ÷ county population × 1,000  (planned work is printed, never counted)
≥ 25 Significant · ≥ 5 Moderate · < 5 Minimal — only if the four reporting utilities cover the county
Calaveras  134 ÷ 44,650 × 1,000 = 3.001 · coverage full → suggested Green — Minimal
Fresno  0.541 per 1,000 · PWRPA covers 14.32 % outside the feed → no suggestion
California  0.028 per 1,000 · always partial → no suggestion

The thresholds are this app's, not FEMA's, and every screen and export says so. Coverage is an equal-area share with a 0.5 % floor, built from the utility territories: 18 of 58 counties are fully covered — the only places Green can ever be suggested.

Measured, then corrected by the build: LADWP covers 11.54 % of Los Angeles County — not the probe's 11.83 %, which counted its hole rings as covered ground. Solano / City of Pittsburg sits at 0.498 %, within 0.002 pt of the floor, so near-floor shares are re-measured on a finer grid. Worked figures: data of 2026-10-21 12:56Z.

Calaveras County selected: the Power Grid component shows a hollow MINIMAL chip, suggested Green — not recommended, with the line below 5 per 1,000; the 4 reporting utilities cover this county.
Calaveras, full coverage, live data of 17:26Z: Power Grid suggested Green — not recommended, hollow. The Energy row itself stays grey, because Fuel has no feed.
The signature loop — a person sets the colour

A feed can only suggest. The branch recommends.

The recommendation dialog for Energy / Power Grid in Calaveras County: the five FEMA statuses, the recommender's initials and role, Impacts, Actions, Limiting factors, Estimated time to status change, and the LOCAL — NOT SHARED notice on the Save button.
The toolkit's six-part assessment — component · status · impacts · actions · limiting factors · estimated time to status change. Saved as Local — not shared
  • Agreement is printed on the row. agrees · overrides · no suggestion possible — with who and when.
  • An override needs a reason. Without one it is refused; with one it is saved as overrides.
  • The app never changes the person's colour. If the feed moves later the row reads suggestion changed since recommended — review.
  • The estimated time is the person's. Utility restore times are printed as the utility's estimate — or restore time passed, no estimate published — never as the toolkit's ETA.
  • It leaves as an export. A lifeline status briefing in the Senior Leadership Brief's Tier I / Tier II grid, and a status JSON for the EOC's system to ingest.
Every live number shows its age

"Live" means polling at a measured cadence.

data.ca.gov says the outage feed updates every 15 minutes. A two-read probe in the morning said 30 — reads at 11:09 and 11:30 could not see an 11:11 publish. Consecutive changes in the afternoon settled it:

lastEditDate  12:56:10 → 13:11:12 → 13:26:12  15 min, twice
every response carries Cache-Control: max-age=300  5-min CDN cache
withdraw at 40 min  = 2 × 15 + 5 cache + 5 slack

A failed refresh keeps the last good data and degrades only the freshness. During the build one geometry answer arrived as HTTP 200 with ~9.4 MB of truncated JSON — now treated as a failed refresh, never as data.

Stated honestly: the suite's own cadence check (CADENCE=1, two reads ≥ 16 min apart) was not run for this build — the 15-minute figure rests on the probe reads above.

Calaveras County with the outage feed blocked: the ledger says Outage feed refresh failed 10:39 — showing data fetched 10:37, and the Power Grid line reads Evidence stale — last good fetch 10:37 PDT. No suggestion. The person's recommended Green stays solid.
The browser driver blocks the Cal OES host mid-session and advances the clock 41 minutes: the suggestion is withdrawn — "Evidence stale — last good fetch 10:37 PDT. No suggestion." The person's recommended Green stays, untouched. A forced failure, not a real outage of the feed.
The second loop — what an outage area touches next

Click an outage. Read a cascade that says it is a guess.

The cascade lens opened on live PG&E outage area 383192 in Monterey County, 1,121 customers, unplanned: hop 1 lists Nacimiento Hydro Project and Oak Shores fire station inside the area, Nacimiento Water Company large at about 57.9 % of its service area, and Heritage Ranch CSD touches at about 0.124 %.
A live PG&E outage area, 2026-10-21: Monterey, 1,121 customers, unplanned. The header — Heuristic geographic co-location, not network topology. Validate every item with the utility — never scrolls away.

Typed by CISA's dependency kinds. Hop 1: assets inside the outage area, and water systems whose service area it overlaps — tagged large ≥ 25 % · partial 5–25 % · touches < 5 %. Hop 2: hospitals inside a large or partial system, inferred.

Why the overlap share existsFresno · 13:06Z
Outage area 11282628unplanned1 customer
City of Fresno water systemserves545,970
Share of that service area inside the outage0.005 %
Hospitals a naive chain calls "downstream"incl. a comprehensive ED9

So touches hospitals are counted, not listed, and no population is ever summed — the naive sum across that morning's overlapping systems was 2,837,834. One system can arrive as several polygons, so systems are grouped by their number, never counted by polygon.

The California spine — all public, all keyless, every trap inverted on purpose

Eleven bound feeds. Six traps that decide the colour.

Outage areas are PG&E only

Areas carry PGE on 30 of 30 rows; the incident points carry four utilities. So the impact comes from the incidents, and every exposure figure says PG&E areas only.

"Intersects" is not "served by"

By plain intersection, LADWP sits in Fresno County on a 0.016 % boundary sliver. Coverage is an equal-area share with a stated floor — and the territory layers were last edited 2024-08-28, printed on screen.

A token gate answers HTTP 200

CEC substations, Cal OES hospitals and PSPS Current all return 200 with {"error":{"code":499}}. Read the body, label the lane gated, and never substitute a look-alike.

Never assume the OID

HCAI's is ObjectId; the water layer's is OBJECTID_1, beside a decoy integer column literally named OBJECTID; FEMA's is lower-case. Each is read from the layer's own metadata at boot.

"PSPS Active" is a 2021 fossil

One row, last edited 2021-04-14. Drawn as an active shutoff, it would be a lie on the map. There is no live keyless PSPS feed, and the board says so.

An editable public service

HCAI's facility listing advertises Create, Delete, Update to the public. The capability is not an invitation: bound read-only, paged at 1,000, with the 8 rows at (0, 0) filtered out.

The spine: Cal OES outage incidents and areas · 58 counties (an undated population baseline, Σ 38,340,074, printed as undated) · 454 open general acute care hospitals (HCAI) · 4,991 drinking-water service areas · 2,082 operating power plants · 931 active CAL FIRE stations · CHHS and FEMA ESF-6 shelters, counted by source and never summed. Not bound, each cited on screen: substations, PSPS, CAISO grid condition, fuel stations, and the dead HIFLD mirror.

Proof, not promises

Built, driven and measured — 2026-10-21.

1,143assertions green — 454 live · 462 offline · 227 in real headless Chrome
23 / 0map-controls conformance passed / failed · check-drift OK, 40 vendored files identical
4.67lowest informational contrast ratio, measured in both themes — the floor is 4.5
0API keys, build steps and npm dependencies — node server.mjs and it runs

Every state is designed

A failed refresh, stale evidence and an empty feed are each forced by the browser driver and screenshotted: last-good kept, suggestion withdrawn, "No outages reported … by the 4 reporting utilities" — never drawn as zero or green.

The screenshots changed the map

At state view, asset markers drowned the outage areas. Assets outside an outage now draw smaller and fainter; assets inside keep full size and a red outline. The same review kept the grey basemap pair over OSM Dark, whose greens competed with the evidence.

Not yet proved

No browser was left running through 30+ minutes of real polls; staleness is proved by advancing the clock, and the suite's own 15-minute cadence check was not run. drive.mjs needs at least one live PG&E outage area — a quiet day turns it red with no app defect.

Reading the figures: every number on these slides is from a live public service on the date named, or from the shipped app's own run. Nothing is seeded and no data is generated — the operator's recommendations start empty and stay in the browser until exported.

Stated as boundaries, not caveats

What this application will not do.

  • Beside command, never in it. Not WebEOC, CLSS or the EOC's lifeline record; not the validated Senior Leadership Brief. Leadership validates in the EOC's own system.
  • Not a utility outage system and not a source of restoration times. Utility estimates are printed as theirs, and are often already past — 27 rows published none on re-probe.
  • The cascade is co-location, never topology. Feeder-to-facility data is gated; no backup-power status is published for any asset.
  • One component in thirty. Communications, Transportation, Hazardous Materials, Wastewater, Fuel: no keyless live status feed. Grey, each with its reason.
  • The rate is a proxy. No keyless source publishes customers served per county; the population baseline is undated.
  • Recommendations are one operator's, in one browser, until exported. A write-back to your own authenticated table is a documented helper, off by default.
  • No what-if zone, no ranking, no distance. No drawn hazard, no ranked lifelines, no territory stress ranking or PSPS notice — and no proximity figure anywhere.
  • California, English only. The market is where every suggestion traces to a keyless source. The gallery's licence tags are a library gap, recorded open.

Every one of these is written into the delivered application's own README. A board that hides its edges hands leadership a colour it cannot defend.

Point it at your jurisdiction

One outage feed.
Your lifeline assets beside it.

Your published outage feed, the utility territories that say where it reaches, a jurisdiction baseline, and the asset layers your lifeline leads already keep. The board then shows how much of each colour your evidence supports — and how old it is.

It runs beside what you own: CLSS, Esri's Community Lifelines Editor or WebEOC keep the record; the board supplies the evidence and exports a Tier I / Tier II briefing and a status JSON. The suggestion thresholds are set when you configure it and printed as yours. For an industrial or energy operator's own centre, the same board reads the public lifeline inputs to its region.

tabaqat.net → Solutions → Emergency Management info@tabaqat.net
© 2026 Tabaqat · Built on Strata. Reference implementation over California, probed 2026-10-21. Esri, ArcGIS, WebEOC and other marks are used nominatively; not affiliated or endorsed. Not the lifeline status of record.
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